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Provocation and Responsibility$
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Jeremy Horder

Print publication date: 1992

Print ISBN-13: 9780198256960

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198256960.001.0001

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Justifying Mitigation Morally

Justifying Mitigation Morally

(p.111) 6 Justifying Mitigation Morally
Provocation and Responsibility

Jeremy Horder

Oxford University Press

This chapter deals with explanations that have been given by leading commentators for the key justificatory characteristic of the doctrine of provocation, and with the concepts of anger that underpin those explanations. The sections that follow in this chapter examine the importance of moral justification; provocation and causation; causation and conceptions of anger; anger as irresistible impulse; provocation and personality as causes; anger and moral character; character and criminal culpability; and justified retribution and law reform.

Keywords:   moral justification, irresistible impulse, personality, moral character, criminal culpability

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