Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Brian Bix

Print publication date: 1995

Print ISBN-13: 9780198260509

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198260509.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 06 July 2022

The Application (and Mis-Application) of Wittgenstein'S Rule-Following Considerations to Legal Theory

The Application (and Mis-Application) of Wittgenstein'S Rule-Following Considerations to Legal Theory

Chapter:
(p.36) 2 The Application (and Mis-Application) of Wittgenstein'S Rule-Following Considerations to Legal Theory
Source:
Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy
Author(s):

Brian Bix

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198260509.003.0003

Wittgenstein proposed to scrutinize problems arising out of inquiries into the normative nature of language, logic, and reasoning, particularly on standard practices that are misleadingly easy to comprehend. What is it about our rules that classify our responses as right or wrong? Legal indeterminacy theorists follow Wittgenstein's conclusion that the justification for the correct or wrong interpretation of the conceptual meaning is determined by the influential political and ideological consensus of the community. In contrast, Pears' discussion favours those opposing Wittgenstein: acknowledging gaps from language to the world. Proponents and opponents of radical indeterminacy have attempted to use Wittgenstein to support their stand, but the argument can only be as adequate as the limitations of rule-following considerations in understanding clear cases and hard cases.

Keywords:   Wittgenstein, normative nature, standard practices, legal indeterminacy, consensus, rule-following, clear cases, hard cases

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .