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Practical Reason and Norms$
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Joseph Raz

Print publication date: 1999

Print ISBN-13: 9780198268345

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268345.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 08 March 2021

On reasons for action

On reasons for action

Chapter:
(p.15) 1 On reasons for action
Source:
Practical Reason and Norms
Author(s):

Joseph Raz

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268345.003.0002

As well as reasons for actions, there are reasons for beliefs, for desires and emotions, for attitudes, for norms and institutions, and many others. Of these, reasons for action and for belief are the most fundamental types of reasons, the others being derived from or dependent on them. This chapter deals exclusively with reasons for action. That which is a reason has been variously identified with statements, beliefs, and facts. It seems that most of the difficulties in regarding reasons as relations between facts and persons turn on examination to be the same as the difficulties concerning probabilities or, at any rate, amenable to treatment in a similar way. It is the world which guides our action, but since it inevitably does so through our awareness of it, our beliefs are important for the explanation and assessment of our behaviour.

Keywords:   reasons for action, beliefs, norms, facts, statements, persons, behaviour

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