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Aquinas’s Theory of Natural LawAn Analytic Reconstruction$
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Anthony J. Lisska

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198269670

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.001.0001

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The Veatch Rejoinder: Ontological Foundationalism

The Veatch Rejoinder: Ontological Foundationalism

(p.166) 7 The Veatch Rejoinder: Ontological Foundationalism
Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law

Anthony J. Lisska

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines the concepts central to the moral theory of philosopher Henry Veatch. It reveals that Veatch has adopted a metaphysical realism structurally similar to that of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas as the ontological foundation of his naturalist meta-physics. It explains the concepts used by Veatch as presuppositions and analyses how his method differs from much contemporary philosophical activity in analytical ethical theory. This chapter also compares Veatch’s metaphilosophy with that of John Finnis.

Keywords:   moral theory, Henry Veatch, metaphysical realism, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, metaphilosophy, John Finnis, naturalist meta-physics, ethical theory

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