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Aquinas’s Theory of Natural LawAn Analytic Reconstruction$
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Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction

Anthony J. Lisska

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198269670

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 24 January 2021

Natural Law Revisited

Natural Law Revisited

Chapter:
(p.188) 8 Natural Law Revisited
Source:
Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law
Author(s):

Anthony J. Lisska

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.003.0008

This chapter examines how Thomas Aquinas' natural law ethical theory might fit into the programme of contemporary moral and legal discussions. The analyses in this chapter indicate how Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas might resolve the is/ought problem and transcend the naturalistic fallacy. This chapter identifies several principles that Aquinas needs to assume in order for his theory of natural law to be a consistent theory of ethical naturalism. These principles include a theory of natural kinds, a metaphysics of finality, and a consistent theory of practical reason.

Keywords:   natural law, ethical theory, Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle, naturalistic fallacy, ethical naturalism, reason, finality

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