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Rush to UnionUnderstanding the European Federal Bargain$
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David McKay

Print publication date: 1996

Print ISBN-13: 9780198280583

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198280583.001.0001

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(p.123) 6 Theory
Rush to Union

David McKay

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines the viability of political unions. It argues that monetary unions bring a degree of economic centralization that may require, in certain circumstances, a high degree of political centralization. Whether such political centralization is acceptable depends on the costs and benefits implicit in the particular federal bargain under discussion. The chapter provides a conceptual framework with which to evaluate the viability of political unions in general and the European Union (EU) in particular. It also identifies links between economic and political centralization and its implications for the European case.

Keywords:   political unions, monetary unions, economic centralization, political centralization, European Union, federal bargain

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