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Moral Error TheoryHistory, Critique, Defence$
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Jonas Olson

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198701934

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001

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(p.1) 1 Introduction
Moral Error Theory

Jonas Olson

Oxford University Press

This chapter gives a rationale and a brief overview of the book. It is argued that moral projectivism is congenial to moral error theory. Moral projectivism is, however, compatible with a variety of metaethical views, such as subjectivist and objectivist realism, and non-cognitivism. Different versions of moral error theory are distinguished. A broad distinction is made between standard moral error theory and moderate moral error theory. The problem of how to formulate standard moral error theory is discussed and a solution is proposed.

Keywords:   moral error theory, formulation of, moderate moral error theory, projectivism, standard moral error theory, non-cognitivism, objectivism, subjectivism

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