Projectivist, Non-Cognitivist, and Error Theorist
This chapter considers the metaethics of the Swedish philosopher Axel Hägerström (1868–1939). Hägerström endorsed different versions of moral error theory that he combined with non-cognitivism. Hägerström’s early theory is non-cognitivism combined with the idea that we believe erroneously that our moral utterances are assertions. Hägerström’s later theory combines non-cognitivism about ‘primary’ moral judgements with standard moral error theory about ‘secondary’ moral judgements. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Einar Tegen’s (1884–1965) critique of Hägerström. Tegen offered what is likely the first formulation and defence of moral error theory as we know it today.
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