Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Moral Error TheoryHistory, Critique, Defence$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jonas Olson

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198701934

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 28 November 2020

How to Understand Mackie’s Argument from Queerness (I)

How to Understand Mackie’s Argument from Queerness (I)

(p.79) 5 How to Understand Mackie’s Argument from Queerness (I)
Moral Error Theory

Jonas Olson

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers the argument from queerness and identifies non-naturalist moral realism as its target. A distinction is made between the argument from queerness and the queerness arguments. The first step of the argument from queerness is to identify ways in which moral properties and facts are queer; the second step is to offer debunking explanations of moral belief. Four queerness arguments are identified, concerning supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity. This chapter examines the first three. The first two arguments generalize beyond the moral and the normative to more general issues in metaphysics and epistemology, or reduce to more basic worries about the queerness of non-natural properties. The third argument rests on problematic assumptions about moral facts. It is concluded that the first three queerness arguments are unconvincing.

Keywords:   knowledge, Mackie, motivation, non-naturalism, queerness, supervenience

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .