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Moral Error TheoryHistory, Critique, Defence$
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Jonas Olson

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198701934

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001

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How to Understand Mackie’s Argument from Queerness (II)

How to Understand Mackie’s Argument from Queerness (II)

(p.116) 6 How to Understand Mackie’s Argument from Queerness (II)
Moral Error Theory

Jonas Olson

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that the fourth queerness argument, concerning irreducible normativity, has considerable force. Unlike the first two, this argument does not overgeneralize, and unlike the third it does not rest on problematic assumptions about moral facts. Stephen Finlay’s recent argument that moral error theory attributes to ordinary moral thought and discourse an error that simply is not there, is considered and rejected. It is argued that Finlay’s relativist theory is less plausible than Mackie’s error theory. Finally, some companions-in-guilt responses to the fourth queerness argument are considered and rejected.

Keywords:   companions-in-guilt, Finlay, irreducible normativity, Mackie, relativism

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