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Moral Error TheoryHistory, Critique, Defence$
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Jonas Olson

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198701934

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001

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Ramifications of Moral Error Theory

Ramifications of Moral Error Theory

(p.151) 8 Ramifications of Moral Error Theory
Moral Error Theory

Jonas Olson

Oxford University Press

Critics like Matt Bedke, Terence Cuneo, and David Enoch have recently argued that an error theory that targets irreducible normativity has deeply problematic ramifications for hypothetical reasons, epistemic reasons, and deliberation. These challenges can all be viewed as versions of the companions-in-guilt response to the argument from queerness. It is argued that although Mackie and other error theorists have overlooked or not taken seriously enough the challenges discussed here, they can in the end be overcome. The chapter also considers and rejects Bart Streumer’s recent argument that we cannot believe the error theory.

Keywords:   Bedke, Cuneo, deliberation, Enoch, epistemic reasons, hypothetical reasons, irreducible normativity, Streumer

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