From Thought to Action
From Thought to Action
Can action be the conclusion of practical reasoning? This chapter shows how to answer yes to this question, but does so largely by replacing the question with a better question that has fewer dubious presuppositions. It shows how to understand theoretical reasoning in an entirely analogous way. It then turns to beat off the main principled objections to this account. The first of these is that only belief can be the conclusion of reasoning; the second is that reasoning can take us only to intention, and never to the action intended.
Keywords: reason, reasoning, intention, deliberation, favouring, proposition, action, belief, practical rationality, theoretical rationality
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