Cognitivism about Practical Rationality
Cognitivism about Practical Rationality
Cognitivists about practical rationality argue that rational requirements governing intentions can be explained by rational requirements governing beliefs. This chapter considers the prospects for cognitivism about Means-Ends Coherence in particular. Means-Ends Coherence is the rational requirement, roughly, that one intend the means one believes to be necessary for achieving one’s ends. The first part of the chapter considers a version of cognitivism employing the Strong Belief Thesis, according to which intending to X involves believing one will X. It argues that the Strong Belief Thesis is either false or unable to do the explanatory work the cognitivist needs it to do. In the second part, it considers versions of cognitivism that don’t employ the Strong Belief Thesis, and presents the most plausible version of cognitivism. However, in the third part, it argues that even the most plausible version of cognitivism isn’t good enough.
Keywords: cognitivism, intention, belief, instrumental rationality, means-ends coherence, rational requirements
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
