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Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 9$
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Russ Shafer-Landau

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198709299

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709299.001.0001

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No Coincidence?*

No Coincidence?*

(p.102) 5 No Coincidence?*
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 9

Matthew Bedke

Oxford University Press

The literature is now full of etiological debunking arguments for normative beliefs. This chapter focuses on those arguments that target varieties of normative realism and charge that alignment between belief and fact would be too coincidental, yielding a defeater for justification. One striking thing about this debate is that many folks agree on the key premises of the debunking argument, yet disagree about the epistemic upshot. Here, it tries to sort things out by examining attempts to bring the defeater (or its absence) into sharp relief. In the end, it concludes the best case for defeat rests on a robust sort of insensitivity, what it calls obliviousness of normative belief to non-natural fact.

Keywords:   debunking arguments, evolutionary debunking, etiological debunking, cosmic coincidence, moral epistemology, sensitivity, moral realism, epistemic internalism

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