Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Phenomenal QualitiesSense, Perception, and Consciousness$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Paul Coates and Sam Coleman

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198712718

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 04 August 2020

Moore’s Dilemma

Moore’s Dilemma

(p.146) (p.147) 5 Moore’s Dilemma
Phenomenal Qualities

M. G. F. Martin

Oxford University Press

In 1918 G. E. Moore questioned the assumptions behind traditional sense-datum theories and offered the Multiple Relational Theory of Appearing, which he said could not be ruled out as a possible alternative. In 1953, Moore eventually came to reject the alternative and recommend endorsement of the traditional sense-datum theory again. This chapter explores what Moore’s reservations in 1918 were, what the correct interpretation of the Multiple Relation Theory should be, and why it made sense for him ultimately to reject it. Moore’s paper throws light both on the nature of the argument from illusion as used in the sense-datum tradition, but also as it has been appealed to in more recent discussions of intentional theories of perception.

Keywords:   sense-data, G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, intentionality, content, consciousness, sensible quality, argument from illusion, appearance, theory of appearing

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .