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Andrea Bianchi

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198714088

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714088.001.0001

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Reference without Cognition

Reference without Cognition

Chapter:
(p.77) 4 Reference without Cognition
Source:
On Reference
Author(s):

Genoveva Martí

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714088.003.0005

This chapter criticizes the view, recently defended by David Kaplan and others, that uses of proper names semantically refer to their bearers in virtue of speakers’ having the referents in mind. It is argued that grounding semantic reference in cognition is contrary to the tenets that Kaplan himself contributed to establish in the revolution against descriptivism and internalism in semantics. It is argued also that the having in mind of an object is neither necessary nor sufficient for a use of a name to refer to its bearer. The criticisms lead to a reflection on the institution of naming and to a positive proposal: an externalist view, on which referring with uses of names requires that speakers join systematic, not necessarily social, linguistic practices.

Keywords:   reference, having in mind, proper names, linguistic practices

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