Cognitive and Affective Consciousness—Theories, and What Is and What Isn’t Actual
Cognitive and Affective Consciousness—Theories, and What Is and What Isn’t Actual
Does cognitive and affective consciousness consist only in conscious representations? In only a two-term relation? Our holds on our own conscious representations give us their likeness to linguistic representions—spoken or written representations. So are thinking and wanting to be understood as only or purely representations? Understood by way of the doctrines of a language of thought, or evolutionary causalism as an understanding of representation, or relationism related to functionalism, or the persuasive lingualism of Searle and others? No. The last theory takes conscious representations to be causal intermediaries but also, more importantly, to be semantic and syntactic signs, of which it gives a good account. Conscious representations in actual consciousness are such things, but with the additional essential characteristic that they are indeed actual—as other things talked of with thinking and wanting definitely are not, say self, direction, vehicle, medium, and neural properties.
Keywords: cognitive consciousness, affective consciousness, conscious representations, linguistic representations, pure representations, language of thought, evolutionary causalism, relationism, lingualism, actual representations
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
