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Being, Freedom, and MethodThemes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen$
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John A. Keller

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198715702

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.001.0001

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Must Anselm be Interpreted as a Meinongian?

Must Anselm be Interpreted as a Meinongian?

(p.263) 13 Must Anselm be Interpreted as a Meinongian?
Being, Freedom, and Method

Lynne Rudder Baker

Oxford University Press

Peter van Inwagen recently published an essay entitled “Three Versions of the Ontological Argument” (Van Inwagen 2012). The three versions he labeled “The Meinongian Version,” “The Conceptual Version,” and “The Modal Version,” respectively. This paper proposes a fourth version, which, for want of a better label, is called ‘The Cognitive-Ability Version’. Van Inwagen says that “Anselm’s argument presupposes, and essentially presupposes, an ontology that is … Meinongian” (Van Inwagen 2012: 8). The paper argues otherwise. If it is right, Anselm’s argument in Proslogion II is of the Cognitive-Ability variety, and not captured by any of van Inwagen’s versions of the ontological argument.

Keywords:   Anselm, Proslogion II, Meinong, Cognitive-Ability Version, ontological argument, unmediated causal powers, Great Making Principle, reductio ad absurdum, existence in intellectu, existence in re

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