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Being, Freedom, and MethodThemes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen$
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John A. Keller

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198715702

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 November 2021

Symposium on the Fixity of the Past

Symposium on the Fixity of the Past

Incompatibilism and the Fixity of the Past

(p.140) 7.1 Symposium on the Fixity of the Past
Being, Freedom, and Method

Neal A. Tognazzini

John Martin Fischer

Oxford University Press

This paper evaluates a new argument for the fixity of the past, recently defended by Wesley H. Holliday in ‘Freedom and the Fixity of the Past’ (The Philosophical Review 121). The fixity of the past is a premise used to argue for incompatibilism, and one that many compatibilists deny. Holliday claims that his argument ends the stalemate between compatibilists and incompatibilists concerning this premise. It is argued that Holliday’s argument, while superficially quite plausible, has two related faults. First, it employs a premise that compatibilists are antecedently committed to rejecting. Second, the intuitive motivation given for that premise does not in fact motivate the premise. Together, these problems render Holliday’s argument question-begging.

Keywords:   free will, incompatibilism, compatibilism, modality, fixity of the past

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