Symposium on the Fixity of the Past
Symposium on the Fixity of the Past
Freedom and Modality
This paper provides further motivation for a principle relating freedom and modality that appeared in ‘Freedom and the Fixity of the Past’ (The Philosophical Review, Vol. 121), where the principle was used to argue for incompatibilism about freedom and determinism. Roughly, the principle states that an agent cannot perform an action of a given type if there is no possible world in which an agent performs an action of that type. The paper also replies to objections to this principle from Tognazzini and Fischer (‘Incompatibilism and the Fixity of the Past’, this volume), paying special attention to the problematic character of objections about “begging the question” against compatibilism.
Keywords: free will, incompatibilism, compatibilism, modality, fixity of the past
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