Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Knowledge Through Imagination$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Amy Kind and Peter Kung

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198716808

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716808.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 January 2021

On the Epistemic Value of Imagining, Supposing, and Conceiving

On the Epistemic Value of Imagining, Supposing, and Conceiving

(p.41) 1 On the Epistemic Value of Imagining, Supposing, and Conceiving
Knowledge Through Imagination

Magdalena Balcerak Jackson

Oxford University Press

Philosophers frequently invoke our ability to imagine, conceive or suppose various thing in order to explain how we achieve our cognitive goals when we make decisions about future actions, when we perform thought experiments, and when we engage in games of pretense. But what is the relationship between imaginings, conceivings, and supposings? And what exactly are the epistemic roles they play in the cognitive projects in which they are involved? This chapter provides answers to these questions by first bringing out a contrast between what we do when we imagine and what we do when we suppose, and then by showing how to fit conceivings into the emerging systematic picture of the ways we use different forms of hypothetical thinking to acquire knowledge.

Keywords:   imagination, supposition, conceiving, thought experiment, justification, belief

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .