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Deontic Modality$
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Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198717928

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717928.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 24 June 2021

Decision Theory: Yes! Truth Conditions: No!

Decision Theory: Yes! Truth Conditions: No!

Chapter:
(p.47) 2 Decision Theory: Yes! Truth Conditions: No!
Source:
Deontic Modality
Author(s):

Nate Charlow

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717928.003.0003

Nate Charlow makes a case for packing the fruits of the study of rational decision-making into our semantics for deontic modals—specifically, for parametrizing the truth-condition of a deontic modal to things such as decision problems and decision theories (and ultimately also things such as moral and epistemological views). Then it knocks it down. While the fundamental relation of the semantic theory must relate deontic modals to such things as decision problems and theories, this semantic relation is not helpfully understood as representing the conditions under which a deontic modal is true. Rather it represents the conditions under which it is accepted by a semantically competent agent. This in turn motivates a reorientation of the whole of semantic theorizing, away from the truth-conditional paradigm, toward a form of expressivism.

Keywords:   deontic modal, decision theory, Angelika Kratzer, Miner Paradox, expressivism

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