The starting point for this book is a particular answer to the fundamental question — what kind of thing are we? The particular answer is that we are animals (of a certain sort)—a view nowadays called ‘animalism’. Many philosophers reject this answer. The aim of the book is to propose, contrary to that attitude, that there are strong reasons to believe animalism, and that when properly analysed, the objections against it that philosophers have given are not convincing. The initial chapters analyse the content and general philosophical implications of animalism—these implications relate primari ... More

The starting point for this book is a particular answer to the fundamental question — what kind of thing are we? The particular answer is that we are animals (of a certain sort)—a view nowadays called ‘animalism’. Many philosophers reject this answer. The aim of the book is to propose, contrary to that attitude, that there are strong reasons to believe animalism, and that when properly analysed, the objections against it that philosophers have given are not convincing. The initial chapters analyse the content and general philosophical implications of animalism—these implications relate primarily to the so-called problem of personal identity, and that of the unity of consciousness—and they also provide a framework which categorizes the standard philosophical objections. It is then argued that animalism is consistent with a perfectly plausible account of the central notion of a ‘person’, and it criticizes the accounts offered by Locke and by Wiggins of that notion. The next two chapters argue that there are very strong reasons to think animalism is true, and some central claims about animal which are relevant to the argument are proposed. The rest of the book considers the lack of cogency of the standard philosophical objections. In considering many types of objections the views of various philosophers, including Nagel, Shoemaker, Johnston, Wilkes, and Olson are also considered. The book then concludes by considering other types of objections and dismissing them. The conclusion by the end is that animalism represents a highly commonsensical and defensible way of thinking about ourselves, and that its rejection by philosophers rests on the tendency when doing philosophy to mistake fantasy for reality.