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Judgment and Agency$
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Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198719694

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.001.0001

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The Unity of Action, Perception, and Knowledge

The Unity of Action, Perception, and Knowledge

(p.7) 1 The Unity of Action, Perception, and Knowledge
Judgment and Agency

Ernest Sosa

Oxford University Press

This chapter places our approach within a broader project of metaphysical, semantic, and conceptual analysis that targets human attainments more generally, whether they take the form of action, perception, or knowledge. It considers the problem of causal deviance as it arises for Donald Davidson’s account of intentional action, and for our own account of human knowledge, and the chapter considers a similar problem for Paul Grice’s causal analysis of perception. These can be viewed as metaphysical analyses of their respective targets. Thus viewed they are defensible against common objections—of either vicious circularity or insufficient content—that have been thought lethal. Those accounts are also defensible, moreover, against critiques that have been thought to favor disjunctivist alternatives. The chapter’s conclusion sketches a methodology appropriate for our inquiry.

Keywords:   action, perception, knowledge, disjunctivism, metaphysical analysis

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