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Judgment and Agency$
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Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198719694

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 04 August 2021

Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Human Agency

Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Human Agency

Chapter:
10 Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Human Agency
Source:
Judgment and Agency
Author(s):

Ernest Sosa

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.003.0010

This chapter offers a new interpretation of Pyrrhonian epistemology, one in line with the epistemology developed in the preceding three parts. Our account of judgment understands it as an inherently second-order phenomenon that requires a reflective stance (even if only a subconscious and implicit awareness). The absence of that stance, and even the absense of any conscious act of alethic (truth-aimed) affirmation, is compatible with the presence of intellectual appearances, degrees of confidence, including the resultant ones that we can identify with credences. And the Pyrrhonists can then exercise their rationality by refusing to endorse such credences until the rational case in favor of doing so rises to the required level. Meanwhile they can continue to live by their credences (resultant intellectual appearances).

Keywords:   Pyrrhonian skepticism, human agency, intellectual appearances, epistemic regress

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