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Judgment and Agency$
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Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198719694

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 03 August 2021

Descartes’s Pyrrhonian Virtue Epistemology

Descartes’s Pyrrhonian Virtue Epistemology

Chapter:
(p.233) 11 Descartes’s Pyrrhonian Virtue Epistemology
Source:
Judgment and Agency
Author(s):

Ernest Sosa

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.003.0011

Here it is argued that in his epistemology Descartes offers a virtue epistemological account of certainty, and by implication of knowledge more generally, and that in doing so he is focused on Pyrrhonian concerns. According to this account, Descartes adopts the Pyrrhonian framework. But he takes himself to provide the rationale required for proper endorsement. Accordingly, he can judge rationally on the first order, even by the highest standards, in line with first-order credence and in line with first-order judgments. The chapter argues in detail for why this interpretation is the best way to read Descartes, and for how well it illuminates the texts.

Keywords:   epistemic certainty, error, assent, endorsement, judgment

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