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Judgment and Agency$
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Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198719694

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.001.0001

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A Better Virtue Epistemology Further Developed

A Better Virtue Epistemology Further Developed

Chapter:
(p.89) 4 A Better Virtue Epistemology Further Developed
Source:
Judgment and Agency
Author(s):

Ernest Sosa

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.003.0004

This chapter first integrates degrees of confidence with the account offered in the preceding chapter, and then considers two forms of representation, the functional and the judgmental. Both forms of representation fall under our AAA account of performance normativity, since they both are performances with a constitutive truth-aim. One of them does so through our animal teleology, the other through our rational capacities, such as our judgmental competence. The last subsection, “A Theory of Competence,” contains a theory of competence aimed to fit our virtue epistemology, with two central notions: that of the apt alethic affirmation (aimed at truth), whose correctness manifests the pertinent epistemic competence of the believer, and that of the fully apt affirmation, one aimed at aptness and aptly guided to it.

Keywords:   functional representation, apt belief, confidence, credence, competence

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