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Judgment and Agency$
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Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198719694

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.001.0001

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Knowledge and Action

Knowledge and Action

(p.133) 6 Knowledge and Action
Judgment and Agency

Ernest Sosa

Oxford University Press

Here the chapter distinguishes a kind of knowledge generally involved even in simple, ordinary means-end human action, and explores how Aristotelian virtue ethics fits within a framework of action that is often thus knowledge dependent. This is a form of animal knowledge, which can be found even subcredally. The chapter explores how forms of knowledge are importantly integral to human action and how well this comports with an Aristotelian approach to human action and to human flourishing. It is argued that in his account of the successful action that constitutes human flourishing, Aristotle makes crucial use of a notion of aptness, or success that manifests competence.

Keywords:   action, Aristotle, virtue ethics, means-end, animal knowledge

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