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Judgment and Agency$
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Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198719694

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 28 July 2021

Intentional Action and Judgment

Intentional Action and Judgment

Chapter:
(p.154) 7 Intentional Action and Judgment
Source:
Judgment and Agency
Author(s):

Ernest Sosa

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.003.0007

This chapter turns to a topic broached already in Chapter 1: the nature of intentional action and the conditions for its aptness. In the end not even a weak subcredal form of knowledge turns out to be required for intentional action, which means that the way in which knowledge of various levels and degrees bears on action is less exclusive than appears at first consideration. Knowledge bears on action by making it more creditable than otherwise, by making it more competent than otherwise, and thereby more apt. But knowledge of no level or degree is necessarily required for action that will be minimally apt, competent, intentional, and creditable.Finally, a notion of simple intentional action is defined and used to explicate judgment and its relation to action.

Keywords:   intentional action, aptness of action, simple action, basic action

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