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Judgment and Agency$
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Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198719694

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.001.0001

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Social Roots of Human Knowledge

Social Roots of Human Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.168) 8 Social Roots of Human Knowledge
Source:
Judgment and Agency
Author(s):

Ernest Sosa

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.003.0008

This chapter has recourse to social epistemology for an account of the “reliability enough” required for competence and for aptness. One is said to “know that p” period iff one aptly believes that p reliably enough for storage of the belief even after the loss of the original basis for its acquisition. No mere guess is good enough to be stored, so as to remain in place even once its initial credentials are gone; only knowledge is suitable for such storage. The chapter explores why and how it matters that the belief be thus “reliable enough.” Compatibly, what you know well enough for storage may not be something you know well enough for it to provide a practical basis for action when the stakes are high. So you might know something “flat out” even if you do not know it well enough to act on it when the stakes are high.

Keywords:   social epistemology, value of knowledge, pragmatic encroachment, reliability enough

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