Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Judgment and Agency$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198719694

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 July 2021

Epistemic Agency

Epistemic Agency

(p.192) 9 Epistemic Agency
Judgment and Agency

Ernest Sosa

Oxford University Press

Varieties of epistemic agency are distinguished, and we explore how such agency is related to normativity, freedom, reasons, competence, and skepticism. Three regions of our lives are distinguished: first a region of passivity populated by passive states such as pains and itches, second a region of functionings, which includes functional mental states, the functionality of some of which is explained for example in terms of the teleology of our perceptual systems, and third a region of free actions. In each case we find states of special interest and importance for epistemology. This threefold divide helps us to better formulate and resolve problems of epistemic regress or circularity, and other issues of traditional epistemology.

Keywords:   epistemic normativity, freedom of action, reasons, competence, epistemic agency, skepticism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .