From Intervention to the Dayton Agreement, 1992–1995
This chapter investigates cooperation between NATO and the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) during the Bosnian War. It argues that the level of cooperation depended on the organizations’ resource dependence perceptions: In a first phase from July 1992 to July 1995, NATO and the UN adopted a dysfunctional “dual key” procedure for the authorization of air strikes to protect designated safe areas for civilians from attack. The agreement reflected most member states’ assessments that closer coordination of UN ground forces with NATO air power was unnecessary for attaining the modest goal of conflict containment. The July 1995 massacre at Srebrenica dramatically altered this perception. In a second phase from late July to December 1995, both organizations overhauled the dual key mechanism and cooperated closely during NATO’s sustained air campaign against Bosnian Serb forces, which laid the ground for the December 1995 Dayton Peace Accords.
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