Can Judicial Selection Secure Judicial Independence?
Can Judicial Selection Secure Judicial Independence?
Constraining State Governments in Selecting International Judges
This chapter examines the process of judicial selection in light of the goal of ensuring judicial independence. Its first part reflects upon the notion of judicial independence of international courts. The second part focuses on the selection of international judges. It is suggested that from the perspective of institutional design, additional mechanisms to constrain state governments must be introduced, be it at the national or the international level. They should offer incentives for governments to seek and appoint the most suitable candidates without denying the role politics inevitably play. Finally, four such mechanisms are discussed in depth with particular attention being paid to the CJEU and the ECtHR: the involvement of parliamentary bodies, advisory expert panels, transparency, and tenure and reappointment.
Keywords: judicial independence, impartiality, role of state governments, limiting governmental action, transparency, parliamentary bodies, tenure, reappointment
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