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The Philosophy of Trust$
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Paul Faulkner and Thomas Simpson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198732549

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 January 2022

Deciding to Trust

Deciding to Trust

(p.161) 10 Deciding to Trust
The Philosophy of Trust

Benjamin McMyler

Oxford University Press

Theorists of trust often contend that we can decide to trust in a way that we cannot decide to believe, that trust is subject to the will in a way in which belief is not. I argue that even if one thinks that trusting a person to do something does not require certain associated beliefs, such as the belief that the person is trustworthy, one should reject the idea that we can trust at will. There is good reason to think that we cannot trust directly at will, in the way that we can act, regardless of whether trust requires belief. Attitudes that are directly subject to the will do not admit of ‘reasons of the wrong kind’; yet trust does so admit. This chapter proposes an account of the attitude of trust that explains why it is that we cannot trust at will.

Keywords:   trust, trustworthiness, action, decision, voluntary, belief, reasons

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