- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 From No Drop to Probabilism
- 2 Formulating the dominance principle
- 3 Measuring accuracy: existing accounts
- 4 Measuring accuracy: a new account
- 5 The Bronfman objection
- 6 Howson’s robustness objection
- 7 The accuracy argument for Probabilism
- Part II Chance-credence principles
- 8 The Principal Principle
- 9 Vindication and chance
- 10 Dominance and chance
- 11 Self-undermining chances
- Part III The Principle of Indifference
- 12 Maximin and the Principle of Indifference
- 13 Hurwicz, regret, and 𝒞‐maximin
- Part IV Accuracy and updating
- 14 Plan Conditionalization
- 15 Diachronic Conditionalization
- 16 Where next for epistemic utility theory?
- Bibliography
- Index
Vindication and chance
Vindication and chance
- Chapter:
- (p.106) 9 Vindication and chance
- Source:
- Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
- Author(s):
Richard Pettigrew
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter introduces a first attempt at an accuracy-based argument for chance-credence principles. It adapts the accuracy-based argument for Probabilism by changing the notion of vindication from that proposed by the veritist to an alternative that has been endorsed by Alan Hájek. The chapter argues that, ultimately, it fails.
Keywords: Vindication, accuracy, Principal Principle, chance, Alan Hájek
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 From No Drop to Probabilism
- 2 Formulating the dominance principle
- 3 Measuring accuracy: existing accounts
- 4 Measuring accuracy: a new account
- 5 The Bronfman objection
- 6 Howson’s robustness objection
- 7 The accuracy argument for Probabilism
- Part II Chance-credence principles
- 8 The Principal Principle
- 9 Vindication and chance
- 10 Dominance and chance
- 11 Self-undermining chances
- Part III The Principle of Indifference
- 12 Maximin and the Principle of Indifference
- 13 Hurwicz, regret, and 𝒞‐maximin
- Part IV Accuracy and updating
- 14 Plan Conditionalization
- 15 Diachronic Conditionalization
- 16 Where next for epistemic utility theory?
- Bibliography
- Index
