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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence$
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Richard Pettigrew

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198732716

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 05 March 2021

Self-undermining chances

Self-undermining chances

Chapter:
(p.133) 11 Self-undermining chances
Source:
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Author(s):

Richard Pettigrew

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0012

In the previous chapters in this part of the book, it has been assumed that the objective chances are not self-undermining—that is, they assign maximal probability to the hypothesis that says that they themselves are the chances. This chapter explores what happens to the arguments when this assumption is dropped. The chapter discusses the New Principle as well as Jenann Ismael’s General Recipe.

Keywords:   Undermining futures, Self-undermining chances, chance, New Principle, Jenann Ismael

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