- Title Pages
- 1 From No Drop to Probabilism
- 2 Formulating the dominance principle
- 3 Measuring accuracy: existing accounts
- 4 Measuring accuracy: a new account
- 5 The Bronfman objection
- 6 Howson’s robustness objection
- 7 The accuracy argument for Probabilism
- Part II Chance-credence principles
- 8 The Principal Principle
- 9 Vindication and chance
- 10 Dominance and chance
- 11 Self-undermining chances
- Part III The Principle of Indifference
- 12 Maximin and the Principle of Indifference
- 13 Hurwicz, regret, and 𝒞‐maximin
- Part IV Accuracy and updating
- 14 Plan Conditionalization
- 15 Diachronic Conditionalization
- 16 Where next for epistemic utility theory?
- (p.133) 11 Self-undermining chances
- Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
- Oxford University Press
In the previous chapters in this part of the book, it has been assumed that the objective chances are not self-undermining—that is, they assign maximal probability to the hypothesis that says that they themselves are the chances. This chapter explores what happens to the arguments when this assumption is dropped. The chapter discusses the New Principle as well as Jenann Ismael’s General Recipe.
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