- Title Pages
- 1 From No Drop to Probabilism
- 2 Formulating the dominance principle
- 3 Measuring accuracy: existing accounts
- 4 Measuring accuracy: a new account
- 5 The Bronfman objection
- 6 Howson’s robustness objection
- 7 The accuracy argument for Probabilism
- Part II Chance-credence principles
- 8 The Principal Principle
- 9 Vindication and chance
- 10 Dominance and chance
- 11 Self-undermining chances
- Part III The Principle of Indifference
- 12 Maximin and the Principle of Indifference
- 13 Hurwicz, regret, and 𝒞‐maximin
- Part IV Accuracy and updating
- 14 Plan Conditionalization
- 15 Diachronic Conditionalization
- 16 Where next for epistemic utility theory?
- (p.187) 14 Plan Conditionalization
- Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
- Oxford University Press
This chapter begins Part IV of the book, which treats the accuracy arguments for principles that govern how agents should change their credences in the light of new evidence. The chapter considers the synchronic versions of these principles, which govern how a rational agent will plan to update, even though they say nothing about how such an agent will in fact update. The chapter treats Conditionalization in particular.
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