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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence$
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Richard Pettigrew

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198732716

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 05 March 2021

Formulating the dominance principle

Formulating the dominance principle

Chapter:
(p.20) 2 Formulating the dominance principle
Source:
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Author(s):

Richard Pettigrew

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0003

This chapter strengthens the argument for Probabilism given in Chapter 1 by weakening the dominance principle to which it appeals. It shows why the naïve dominance principle from Chapter 1 is in fact too strong.

Keywords:   Dominance principle, decision theory, rational choice

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