- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 From No Drop to Probabilism
- 2 Formulating the dominance principle
- 3 Measuring accuracy: existing accounts
- 4 Measuring accuracy: a new account
- 5 The Bronfman objection
- 6 Howson’s robustness objection
- 7 The accuracy argument for Probabilism
- Part II Chance-credence principles
- 8 The Principal Principle
- 9 Vindication and chance
- 10 Dominance and chance
- 11 Self-undermining chances
- Part III The Principle of Indifference
- 12 Maximin and the Principle of Indifference
- 13 Hurwicz, regret, and 𝒞‐maximin
- Part IV Accuracy and updating
- 14 Plan Conditionalization
- 15 Diachronic Conditionalization
- 16 Where next for epistemic utility theory?
- Bibliography
- Index
Measuring accuracy: existing accounts
Measuring accuracy: existing accounts
- Chapter:
- (p.31) 3 Measuring accuracy: existing accounts
- Source:
- Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
- Author(s):
Richard Pettigrew
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter surveys the existing attempts to characterize the legitimate inaccuracy measures. It considers characterizations due to James M. Joyce as well as the characterization offered by Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Pettigrew. In each case, some of the assumptions required for the characterization are seen to be unjustified.
Keywords: Scoring rule, inaccuracy measure, James M. Joyce, epistemic dilemmas
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 From No Drop to Probabilism
- 2 Formulating the dominance principle
- 3 Measuring accuracy: existing accounts
- 4 Measuring accuracy: a new account
- 5 The Bronfman objection
- 6 Howson’s robustness objection
- 7 The accuracy argument for Probabilism
- Part II Chance-credence principles
- 8 The Principal Principle
- 9 Vindication and chance
- 10 Dominance and chance
- 11 Self-undermining chances
- Part III The Principle of Indifference
- 12 Maximin and the Principle of Indifference
- 13 Hurwicz, regret, and 𝒞‐maximin
- Part IV Accuracy and updating
- 14 Plan Conditionalization
- 15 Diachronic Conditionalization
- 16 Where next for epistemic utility theory?
- Bibliography
- Index
