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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence$
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Richard Pettigrew

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198732716

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.001.0001

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The Bronfman objection

The Bronfman objection

Chapter:
(p.69) 5 The Bronfman objection
Source:
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Author(s):

Richard Pettigrew

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0006

This chapter considers an objection that has been raised against applications of dominance reasoning in those situations in which there is not a single objective measure of utility. In the context of the book, the objection is due to Aaron Bronfman. The chapter concludes that the accuracy argument for Probabilism can be saved only by narrowing down the class of legitimate inaccuracy measures to a single measure.

Keywords:   Aaron Bronfman, dominance principle, imprecise utility, epistemicism, supervaluationism, subjectivism

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