Respect for Equality
Respect for Equality
This chapter considers discrimination that manifests a failure of recognition for the equal value or worth of persons as such. It suggests that respect for a person’s equal value is best understood as grounding a defeasible presumption of equal consideration. This presumption can be overridden, without disrespect, by genuinely relevant differences between persons’ claims to one’s consideration. But it is respect for people’s equal value that sets a baseline of equal concern and requires a special reason for weighing some people’s needs more heavily than others’. One paradigmatic form of wrongful discrimination stems from a failure to respect this presumption of equal regard. The chapter also introduces an important distinction between ordinary disrespect and contempt, understood as willful defiance of normative authority; this distinction helps to explain what is and is not morally similar about classic bigotry and implicit bias.
Keywords: implicit bias, discrimination, equality, equal worth, recognition respect
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