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The Cognitive Penetrability of PerceptionNew Philosophical Perspectives$
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John Zeimbekis and Athanassios Raftopoulos

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198738916

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738916.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 October 2020

Cognitive Penetrability

Cognitive Penetrability

A No-Progress Report

(p.58) (p.59) Chapter 1 Cognitive Penetrability
The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception

Edouard Machery

Oxford University Press

New-Look psychologists such as Jerome Bruner proposed in the 1940s and 1950s that what one believes and what one desires influence what one perceives, but this hypothesis—the cognitive penetrability hypothesis—was widely rejected in the 1970s and 1980s. In recent years, an increasing number of psychologists and philosophers are again embracing the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, a trend this chapter calls ‘the New New Look’. This chapter argues that current empirical research on, and current theoretical arguments for, this hypothesis suffer from the exact same kind of problems that led psychologists and philosophers to reject the New Look forty years ago.

Keywords:   New Look, New New Look, penetration, locus problem, replication failures, demand characteristics

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