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Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience$
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Dennis Patterson and Michael S. Pardo

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198743095

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743095.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 04 December 2020

The Inevitable Mind in the Age of Neuroscience

The Inevitable Mind in the Age of Neuroscience

(p.29) 2 The Inevitable Mind in the Age of Neuroscience
Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience

Stephen J. Morse

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that free will is not a presupposition of criminal law, or any other area of law, and thus causal determinism about mental states and actions (whether illuminated by neuroscience or not) does not undermine legal responsibility. Hence, people who question whether there can be free will in a causal world are simply making a mistake. The chapter thus defends a ‘compatibilist’ position for law (in which free will and causal determinism can coexist). It argues that legal responsibility depends on the degree to which we are responsive to reasons. Because of this, the chapter concludes that neuroscience does not pose any global challenges to legal responsibility and is unlikely to undermine the law’s conceptions of mind, mental states, and action any time soon.

Keywords:   free will, criminal law, causal determinism, mental states, compatibilism, compatibilist approach to law, legal responsibility

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