Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Dennis Patterson and Michael S. Pardo

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198743095

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743095.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 November 2020

Lie-detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence

Lie-detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence

Chapter:
(p.85) 5 Lie-detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence
Source:
Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience
Author(s):

Frederick Schauer

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743095.003.0006

This chapter focuses on neuroscience-based lie-detection from the perspective of the policies and epistemic norms underlying the law of evidence and legal proof. It makes the case that in some instances neuroscientific evidence is superior to forms of evidence (scientific and non-scientific) routinely admitted in legal proceedings. In analysing whether neuroscientific evidence should be admitted or excluded in legal proceedings, the chapter asks the important question: ‘compared to what’? Excluding neuroscientific evidence in order to base decisions on evidence that may be more epistemically problematic appears to run afoul of the law’s evidentiary principles and goals. The chapter also emphasizes the extent to which the epistemic norms and standards at issue involve fundamentally legal and not just scientific questions.

Keywords:   lie-detection, neuroscientific evidence, legal proceedings, epistemic norms, evidence, legal proof

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .