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Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience$
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Dennis Patterson and Michael S. Pardo

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198743095

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743095.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 25 November 2020

Dualism and Doctrine

Dualism and Doctrine

(p.105) 6 Dualism and Doctrine*
Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience

Dov Fox

Alex Stein

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that remnants of substance dualism or the ‘Cartesian’ theory of mind remain entrenched in legal doctrine in torts, criminal law, and constitutional criminal procedure. It contends that neuroscience reveals that dualism is both conceptually bankrupt and empirically flawed. As other chapters in this book argue, advances in neuroscience are putting pressure (or worse) on existing legal doctrines in ways that will force much-needed change. This chapter provides an alternate account of human action, one that avoids the errors of dualism without compromising the law’s goals in these areas, and it suggests changes to correct the doctrine accordingly. The chapter then concludes by bringing the doctrinal and normative implications of this integrationist account full circle.

Keywords:   mind-body dualism, substance dualism, Cartesian theory of mind, legal doctrines, human action

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