Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Dennis Patterson and Michael S. Pardo

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198743095

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743095.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 November 2020

Unconscious Mens Rea: Lapses, Negligence, and Criminal Responsibility

Unconscious Mens Rea: Lapses, Negligence, and Criminal Responsibility

Chapter:
(p.161) 8 Unconscious Mens Rea: Lapses, Negligence, and Criminal Responsibility
Source:
Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience
Author(s):

Katrina L. Sifferd

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743095.003.0009

This chapter considers arguments by Neil Levy for the proposition that direct conscious awareness is a prerequisite for responsibility. It argues that cases of negligent criminal harm indicate that Levy’s claim that moral responsibility requires synchronic conscious awareness of the moral significance of an act is too strict. Furthermore, the chapter claims that tracing conditions cannot be successfully used to bolster Levy’s account. Instead, current legal practices indicate that criminal responsibility requires the capacity for diachronic agency and self-control, not synchronic conscious control. This means that an agent may be responsible for harm related to lapses even if they at no point could have reasonably foreseen the possibility of causing criminal harm.

Keywords:   Neil Levy, direct conscious awareness, negligent criminal harm, synchronic conscious awareness, moral responsibility, criminal responsibility, diachronic agency, self-control

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .