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Causation and Free Will$
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Carolina Sartorio

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198746799

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746799.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 01 July 2022

The Underlying Metaphysics

The Underlying Metaphysics

Completing the Picture

Chapter:
(p.86) 3 The Underlying Metaphysics
Source:
Causation and Free Will
Author(s):

Carolina Sartorio

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746799.003.0004

This chapter covers a discussion of other metaphysical assumptions behind the view introduced in chapter 1. The difference-making aspect of causation and the intransitivity of causation are discussed. The role of luck, in a specific sense, in the view is also discussed and luck is defined in this sense. There is also an attempt to shed light on some interesting asymmetries concerning responsibility for actions and responsibility for omissions. Several of the scenarios introduced in chapter 2 are examined again, to look further into the question of alternative possibilities and responsibility. The chapter concludes with an assertion that a solid foundation is now in place, on which basis to continue the enquiry in chapter 4.

Keywords:   difference-making, intransitivity of causation, luck, responsibility for omission, responsibility for action, actual-sequence view, grounding

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