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Approaches to Intentionality$
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William Lyons

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198752226

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198752226.001.0001

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The Instrumentalist Approach

The Instrumentalist Approach

(p.9) 1 The Instrumentalist Approach
Approaches to Intentionality

William Lyons

Oxford University Press

This chapter discusses the rise of ‘scientific philosophy’, which would expose the logical and conceptual bases of natural sciences. The author traces it back to the 19th-century philosopher Auguste Comte, who led the movement called Logical Positivism, the doctrine that states that the only genuine method of gaining knowledge is by scientific method through observation and experiment. It argues that the fullest and clearest version of an instrumentalist account of intentionality is that of Daniel Dennett's Content and Consciousness. It also chronicles W. V. O. Quine and the intentional vocabulary of psychology, Daniel Dennett and the intentional stance, realism, anti-realism, pragmatism, and reductivism.

Keywords:   scientific philosophy, Comte, Dennett, Content and Consciousness, Quine, intentional stance, Logical Positivism

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