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Approaches to Intentionality$
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William Lyons

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198752226

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198752226.001.0001

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The Purest Functionalism

The Purest Functionalism

(p.123) 5 The Purest Functionalism
Approaches to Intentionality

William Lyons

Oxford University Press

The first part of the chapter presents an outline of the functional role theory of intentionality using the works of Gilbert Harman, Thought, Meaning and Semantics and Language, Thought and Communication. The second section looks into the ascription-interpretation distinction using Loar's view that the proper way to approach an account of beliefs is through distinction between epistemological considerations and metaphysical ones. The third section looks into the functional role, truth-functional role, physical state, logical relations, and truth-conditional relations. The fourth section examines the constraints on naturalizing intentionality: semantic constraint, and network constraint. The fifth section describes the functional role semantics of Loar's account. The final sections summarize the central topics of Loar's account of intentionality, its implications on naturalizing intentionality, and the problems faced by this account.

Keywords:   Loar, Thought, Meaning and Semantics, semantic constraint, network constraint, logical relations, truth-conditional relations, functional role, Harman

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