Essays in Moral Skepticism
Richard Joyce
Abstract
Moral skepticism is the view that there is no such thing as moral knowledge. One form of skepticism (error theory) holds that moral judgments are all false. Another holds that moral judgments are unjustified (and perhaps unjustifiable). This book examines facets of the many debates over moral skepticism: usually in a sympathetic tone and sometimes in the spirit of confident promotion. The collection is divided into three parts. Chapters of the first part deal with aspects of the metaethical debate over the error-theoretic view of morality. Part two discusses the evolution of morality, both as ... More
Moral skepticism is the view that there is no such thing as moral knowledge. One form of skepticism (error theory) holds that moral judgments are all false. Another holds that moral judgments are unjustified (and perhaps unjustifiable). This book examines facets of the many debates over moral skepticism: usually in a sympathetic tone and sometimes in the spirit of confident promotion. The collection is divided into three parts. Chapters of the first part deal with aspects of the metaethical debate over the error-theoretic view of morality. Part two discusses the evolution of morality, both as an empirical hypothesis and as playing a supportive role in establishing the skeptical thesis that moral judgments lack justification. The final part of the collection consists of chapters discussing moral projectivism and moral fictionalism. This collection follows the development of ideas over the period of a decade, and presents a coherent and nuanced picture of modern moral skepticism.
Keywords:
metaethics,
error theory,
moral skepticism,
moral nativism,
debunking arguments,
projectivism,
fictionalism
Bibliographic Information
| Print publication date: 2016 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780198754879 |
| Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016 |
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754879.001.0001 |
